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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the responsiveness of populist parties to the
salience of issues amongst the public focusing on a large number of
issues on which parties campaign during elections. The paper
investigates both left- and right-wing populist parties comparatively
in three countries, namely Austria, Germany and Italy. We ﬁnd that
while populist parties carry out an important responsiveness
function, they are only slightly more responsive than their
mainstream counterparts on the issues they own. The results of this
paper have important implications for our understanding of political
representation and the future of the populist appeal.
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Introduction
Recent general elections in Europe have one common denominator in their outcome: the
electoral success of populist parties. Populist parties have been able to gain substantial vote
share thus becoming important political actors – also in government formation processes.
For instance, in 2017 the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) obtained 26 per cent of the vote,
the Alternative for Germany (AfD) 12.6 per cent and in the Netherlands the Party for
Freedom (PVV) obtained 13.1 per cent. In March 2018 in Italy, the two populist
parties, the League and the Five Star Movement (M5S), were able to substantially increase
their vote share to 17.4 and 32.7 per cent, respectively. Several populist parties have now
entered governments either as partners in governing coalitions – like the FPÖ in Austria –
or as leader of governments – like SYRIZA in Greece and the M5S and the League in Italy.
While populism has been a central concern for political science for some time (e.g.
Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008), the relationship between populist parties and the
public in terms of responsiveness has not yet been analysed in a fully-ﬂedged empirical
eﬀort. For a party to be responsive to the public concerns, it needs to be paying attention
to the preferences of the public by responding to its short-term demands.
Ezrow and Hellwig (2014) show that market integration compounds political parties with
respect to their function of representing and expressing the political views of their electorates.
In particular, economic globalisation as well as the consolidation of a liberal regime for inter-
national ﬁnance appear to compromise party responsiveness to public opinion. In Peter
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Mair’s work (2009, 2014), this concern is epitomised by the tension between ‘responsiveness’
and ‘responsibility’: the internal and international systems constrain parties’ manoeuvre so
that the two roles of parties are increasingly incompatible. Kriesi (2014) argues that the
most likely outcome is a division of roles between mainstream parties (responsible but not
responsive) and peripheral populist parties (responsive but not responsible). Mair (2011)
states that populist parties can potentially fulﬁl an important representation function that
mainstream parties may no longer be able to deliver due to responsibility constraints.
In this paper, we aim to explore empirically whether populist parties aremore responsive to
the short-term demands of public opinion than their mainstream counterparts comparatively
in three countries, namely Austria, Germany and Italy. Responsiveness is understood in this
paper as ‘the capacity to satisfy the governed by executing the policies that correspond to
their demands’ (Morlino, 2008, p. 54). Responsiveness is at the very core of democratic rep-
resentation and it diﬀers from representation in that it is more speciﬁc as it deals with the
decisions taken by representatives after the election. We deliberately focus on issue salience
rather than issue positioning to draw conclusions on parties’ responsiveness function, as
such building upon saliency theory, which states that parties compete by selectively highlight-
ing certain issues during election campaigns (e.g. Jones & Baumgartner, 2005; Sagarzazu &
Klüver, 2017).1We thus follow an established line of literature (e.g. Green-Pedersen&Morten-
sen, 2010; Klüver & Spoon, 2016; Wagner &Meyer, 2014) and the developments within issue
yield theory (De Sio &Weber, 2014) to infer from parties’ issue emphases their responsiveness
to thepublic. Inparticular,we focus onwhether and the extent towhichpopulist parties present
alternative agendas stressing issues that are often kept silent by mainstream parties. We inves-
tigate party responsiveness on a large variety of issues, exploring both left- and right-wing
populist parties and comparing them to mainstream parties. As we conceive populism as a
thin-centred ideology that is usually combined with other ideologies (Mudde, 2004), we
include populist parties from both sides of the ideological spectrum to establish which respon-
siveness void they are able to ﬁll and whether they diﬀer from their mainstream counterparts.
The empirical tests rely on original datasets from the Issue Competition Comparative
Project2 (ICCP) that merge individual-level survey data with information on the salience
of issues for parties in order to evaluate which responsiveness void populist parties may
ﬁll. The data include both a citizen survey to collect information on publics’ issue preferences
right before the heat of the election campaign, and party-level Twitter data to measure
parties’ issue priorities in their oﬃcial communication during the electoral campaign. Elec-
tion campaigns are key moments in representative democracies when parties interact with
the public and attempt to be responsive to the demands and concerns of citizens.
Our ﬁndings indicate that populist parties appear to be slightly more responsive to the
public compared to their mainstream counterparts on issues they own. These ﬁndings
have important consequences for our understanding of political representation and the
challenges and opportunities that populist parties bring in times of the so-called ‘crisis’
of mainstream politics (Mair, 2009), including how they will contribute to the transform-
ation of the established party systems.
Populism, Responsiveness and Liberal Democracy
The minimalistic deﬁnition of populism as a ‘thin-centered ideology that considers society
to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, “the pure
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people” versus the “corrupt elite”, and which argues that politics should be an expression
of the volonté générale (general will) of the people’ (Mudde, 2007, p. 23) has gained pre-
dominance in the existing literature. The speciﬁc deﬁnitions of the ‘people’ and ‘the
corrupt elite’ are, however, often left purposely ambiguous by populist parties (Mudde,
2004), and they are likely to diﬀer depending on the context (Canovan, 1984). For
instance, the people can be identiﬁed as a nation (cultural deﬁnition), as belonging to a
class (economic deﬁnition), or as being the sovereign (political deﬁnition) (e.g. Kriesi,
2014; Mény & Surel, 2001).
While Mudde (2004) points out that populism is often regarded as hostile to liberal
democracy, Canovan stresses the populist appeal as being ‘democratic’ by virtue of appeal-
ing to disenchanted citizens that may have been left behind by the political process. These
contradictions are due to the two pillars enshrined in the concept of liberal democracy:
populists focus mainly on the democratic pillar (= sovereignty of the people) while
neglecting the liberal pillar which calls for independent control to guarantee democratic
check and balances. Thus, the diﬃcult relationship between populism and liberal democ-
racy results from the latter allowing for restrictions on the general will of the sovereign –
the people – by minorities and independent institutions. Indeed, populist politicians
mostly claim that: ‘they speak for the “silent majority” of “ordinary, decent people”,
whose interests and opinions are (they claim) regularly overridden by arrogant elites,
corrupt politicians and strident minorities’ (Canovan, 1999, p. 5). By focusing only on
the sovereignty of the people, populist actors claim that they would ensure closing the
allegedly growing representational gap between the governed and governors (Rovira Kalt-
wasser 2012). In this sense, populist parties can be seen as democratically inclusive, since
they are giving a voice to a ‘silent majority’ (e.g. Huber and Saskia 2017; Mény and Surel
2001; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012).
Mair (2011) points out that it is actually the populist parties that fulﬁl the responsive-
ness function, as mainstream parties nowadays have greater diﬃculties to ‘deliver’. Mair
theorises that mainstream parties face external constraints that restrict their room for
policy manoeuvre, which may not allow them to be responsive towards the concerns of
their electorate. Particularly in times of crisis, populist parties claim to be able to represent
the demands of the public on substantive issues by taking up the ‘grievances of a speciﬁc
part of the population’ (Kriesi, 2014, p. 369), while mainstream (governing) parties are
often forced to take unpopular political decisions due to external constraints like multi-
level governance (see also Karremans and Lefkofridi 2018). Such external constraints
aﬀect the links between parties and the public, and create a strong tension between respon-
siveness to public opinion on the one hand, and governing responsibility on the other,
where responsibility is deﬁned as prudent government based on accepted norms and prac-
tices (Mair 2014). This tension between responsibility and responsiveness should be mini-
mised in the case of populist parties, which continue to put forward policies in spite of
these constraints and hence claim to better represent the needs of the public. Hence,
while external constraints hamper mainstream parties’ competitiveness by limiting their
capacity to highlight issues that they cannot fulﬁl once elected, populist parties act
freely, presenting alternative agendas and stressing issues that are often kept silent by
mainstream parties.
From this perspective populist parties do fulﬁl a central representation function as they
ﬁll a responsiveness gap that exists on certain issues. This might lead to a re-alignment and
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a re-structuring of old ideological conﬂict structures. As Kriesi states: ‘populism is a pro-
ductive force that may serve as the catalyst for a profound realignment of West European
party systems’ (2014, p. 361). Unconstrained by responsibility, populist parties tend to
compete by stressing issues that mainstream parties have avoided for a long time (e.g.
Bardi et al. 2014; Hino 2012). Hence, our ﬁrst hypothesis is that populist parties are more
responsive to the salience of issues for the public than mainstream parties (Hypothesis 1).
The Responsiveness of Left- and Right-Wing Populism
To explore the responsiveness of populist parties vis-à-vis their mainstream counterparts,
neither the generic left-right dimension nor a two-dimensional ideological space (socio-
economic and cultural one) will be suﬃcient. In fact, we need to take into account
recent societal and economic transformations that have especially characterised
Western European societies (Kriesi et al. 2008), and therefore examine more reﬁned
issue groups to capture the potential responsiveness spaces of populist parties.
To deﬁne speciﬁc issue groups, we follow the theoretical insights of the work by Häu-
sermann and Kriesi (2015) who point out that both the cultural and economic dimensions
transformed in a more ﬁne-grained political space over the years. Turning ﬁrst to the cul-
tural dimension, for one, it now includes both issues that can be summarised under cul-
tural liberalism, such as gay marriages and environmental protection, and issues that focus
on the cultural diversity within a society, spanning issues such as immigration and cultural
integration. Concerns related to European integration and national political sovereignty
relate to this cultural dimension as well, albeit they would not necessarily subside into
it (Häusermann and Kriesi, 2015, pp. 204–207).
Transformations also aﬀected the substance of the general socio-economic dimension,
which, if ever the case, can no longer be considered unidimensional (see also Kriesi et al.
2008). In this regard, Häusermann and Kriesi (2015) point toward the distinction between
income redistribution and social investment policies. As they discuss, while welfare states in
Europe typically redistribute on the basis of contributions rather than needs, voter prefer-
ences have recently shown signs of attentiveness to a ‘dualisation of beneﬁts’, which has
become politically relevant. Instead of redistributive policies based on contributions,
these social investment policies are driven by voter preferences on ‘general welfare expan-
sion’ (Häusermann and Kriesi, 2015, pp. 207–210; see also Esping-Andersen et al. 2002).
As far as the argument can be applied here, we should thus separate socio-economic pol-
icies based upon contributions from those social investment policies designed to oﬀset
inequality.
Mainstream parties could potentially face constraints on all these speciﬁc issue groups.
With regard to issues of European integration for example, Hooghe et al. (2002) point out
that mainstream parties generally align to the status quo and are thus favourable of their
country’s membership in the EU and the ‘dictat’ of the community. European integration
aﬀects economic issues (e.g. monetary and ﬁscal policies) for which policy-making has
been largely transferred from national to European institutions (Hellwig 2001), thus con-
straining national governments room for manoeuvre especially in relation to welfare redis-
tribution. Mainstream parties may also be constrained in their issue presentation on
immigration. Discourses entailing extreme (right) issue positions on immigration might
alienate their European partners both with regard to welfare distributions only foreseen
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for nationals, but also on ethnical tolerance of other EU-citizens. While these few examples
show that the room of manoeuver may be restricted for mainstream parties, populist
parties often reject these constraints in an attempt to mobilise voters on exactly these
same constrained issues. We do however expect diﬀerences with regard to the responsive-
ness void populist right and populist left parties aim to fulﬁl.
The diﬀerent deﬁnitions of ‘the people’ populist parties on the right and the left employ
already provide some information with regard to which gap they may aim to ﬁll and on
which speciﬁc issue group populist parties should be more responsive. Speciﬁcally,
while populist left parties classify the people mainly from an economic perspective –
the weak socio-economic groups as the ‘ordinary’ people –, in the discourses of the popu-
list right parties cultural – the belonging to a certain nation – and political perspectives –
against the elites – dominate. Thus, populist right parties are expected to tap into the
responsiveness void on the cultural dimension and reject constraints on immigration,
while the populist left parties are expected do so mainly on the economic dimension by
pushing issues on state investments and welfare provisions (e.g. Akkerman et al. 2014;
Rooduijn and Akkerman 2017). For instance, populist left parties will be more likely to
focus on peoples’ frustration with the unresponsiveness of mainstream parties on issues
like unemployment and poverty that fall under the category of redistribution and social
investment policy. Meanwhile, populist right parties may appeal more to issues pertaining
to immigration and European integration, and thus to ﬁll this void left by mainstream
parties on the right. While populist right parties also consider economic issues when
addressing people on the cultural dimension (see Mény and Surel 2001), Hainmueller
and Hiscox (2007) show that the conﬂict over immigration is mainly dominated by a cul-
tural discourse.
Hence, we hypothesise that populist parties on the right are more responsive to the
issues that are salient for the public related to immigration and European integration
(Hypothesis 2a). Meanwhile, populist left parties will be more responsive on issues
related to redistribution and social investment compared to other issues (Hypothesis 2b).
Populist Parties in Comparison: The cases of Austria, Germany and Italy
Although there are many populist parties and leaders in Europe and beyond, in this paper
we focus on countries in which populist parties on both the left and the right are present in
order to compare their behaviour, holding the electoral context constant. In particular, we
focus on the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) in Austria, the Alternative for Germany (AfD)
in Germany, and the League (Lega) in Italy – up until 2017 known as the Northern
League3 – as prototypical cases of populist parties on the right of the ideological spectrum,
and on the Austrian List Peter Pilz (LPP),4 the German Die Linke and the Italian Five Star
Movement (M5S) as cases of populist parties on the left.5 Particularly, the populist right
parties in Austria and Italy are among the oldest, stable and most established cases of
the populist radical right party family in Europe and can be seen as prime examples of
the type of populism that is predominant in contemporary Europe on the right
(Pauwels 2011). The populist left parties LPP and M5S are relatively new phenomena
while Die Linke has been part of the German party system for some time.6 None of the
parties included in this paper were in government before the election considered in the
paper. Only the FPÖ and the Lega have had government experience in the past
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respectively in 2002 and in 2008. The government status is key in terms of responsiveness
as it constraints party action via responsibility.
Austria’s FPÖ was in the past a relatively small party focused mainly on economic lib-
eralism and nationalism (Luther 1987); the leadership of Jörg Haider starting in 1986 has
brought increasing success to the party by intensifying its focus on nationalism, but also a
drop in success after its ﬁrst government participation between 2000 and 2002. The more
recent general elections saw a surge in support for the FPÖ reaching 26 per cent of the vote
share in 2017 and entering into government with the centre-right party, the Austrian
People’s Party (ÖVP).
Moving to the Italian Lega, the early literature has stressed three main factors behind its
success: anti-government attitudes, hostility towards the underdeveloped south, and
immigration (Diamanti 1996). The Lega has since then expanded its focus also following
its government experience in 2001–2006 and 2008–2011. Recently, under the new leader-
ship of Matteo Salvini, the Lega went from a party mainly focused on the so-called ‘North-
ern question’ to a party embracing the concerns of all (ethnic) Italians with a populist
programme that is strongly anti-immigrant, anti-globalisation, and Eurosceptic (e.g.
Kriesi and Pappas 2015). The party gained 17.4% of the vote in the 2018 election and
formed a government with the M5S.
The AfD was founded in 2013 as a party on the right interested mainly in economic
issues but already including Eurosceptic positions (Decker 2015). While in the 2013
national election the party missed the electoral threshold to enter the German Bundestag,
in 2017 the AfD went well above obtaining 12.6 per cent of the votes. Its main focus stea-
dily shifted towards issues of immigration and integration. Together with its focus on
direct democracy measures, Lewandowsky et al. (2016) classiﬁed the AfD as a classical
populist right party.
Moving to the left, the LPP was founded in July 2017 as a Green spin-oﬀ party by Peter
Pilz – a long-standing Green MP –when the party did not guarantee him a safe seat for the
2017 election (Bodlos and Plescia 2018). Peter Pilz has been known as corruption ﬁghter
and has claimed for several years that the Green party needs to become more populist –
particular on issues related to immigration, but also on social aﬀairs in the aftermath of the
economic and ﬁnancial crisis.
The M5S party was founded in 2009 by Beppe Grillo, a long-time famous comedian,
then activist and blogger.7 The M5S grew very fast and in the two subsequent national
elections, 2013 and 2018, became the largest party in Italy. From the very outset, the
M5S has ﬁercely criticised Italy’s political class, focused on the struggle against corruption,
and is in favour of the direct participation of Italian citizens (Biorcio 2014). The M5S
claims to be neither left-wing nor right-wing with its voters in 2013 on average standing
somewhere around the centre of the left-right ideological spectrum (Colloca and Corbetta
2015). In the most recent election held in March 2018, the M5S attempted to distance itself
from radical right-wing positions on immigration and stressed the intention to collabor-
ate, ﬁrst of all, with parties on the left after the elections. Yet, after the rejection of the
mainstream left party, the Democratic Party (PD), to form a government, the M5S coa-
lesced with the Lega to form the ﬁrst all populist government in Europe.
Die Linke was established in 2007 by merging the successor of the communist party of
Eastern Germany (PDS) and a splinter party of the Social Democratic Party (SPD). One
aim of Die Linke is to overcome capitalism via democratic and social reforms. Overall, it
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refers to the peoples’ economic interest, which stand in sharp contrast to the interests of
economic elites.8 With regard to immigration and integration, Die Linke does not propose
any clear policy position. In the most recent general election in 2017 it received 9.2 per
cent of the vote increasing its vote share by 0.6 per cent since 2013.
In our empirical analysis, we will compare the behaviour in terms of responsiveness of
these populist parties to their mainstream counterparts: the Peoples’ Party (ÖVP), the
Social Democratic Party (SPÖ), the liberal NEOS and the Greens in Austria, the Christian
Democratic Union (CDU-CSU), the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the Free Democratic
Party (FDP) and the Greens in Germany and the PD, Go Italy (FI) and Free and Equal
(LeU) in Italy.
Data and Methods
To test our hypotheses we need reliable measures of citizens’ policy priorities and parties’
responsiveness to these same priorities. To this end, we rely on data from the ICCP project,
a comparative project that collected information on both voters’ and parties’ issue priori-
ties on a large amount of policy issues.
For each of the countries analysed, about 6–8 weeks before the respective general elec-
tion, country experts were asked to provide a list of issues that would most likely charac-
terise the electoral campaign. In terms of citizens, during a pre-electoral survey9 conducted
immediately before the heat of the election campaign, respondents were asked to ﬁrst pos-
ition themselves on these issues on a scale from 1 (extreme left) to 6 (extreme right) and
then to assign a priority to the issues on a scale from 0 (low saliency) to 1 (high saliency)
with 0.5 representing medium saliency.10 Despite a few issues that are speciﬁc to certain
country-election campaigns, the ICCP project is highly consistent across countries in the
issues covered. In particular, in this paper we retain for the empirical analyses all the issues
asked similarly in the three countries and that can be classiﬁed into the ﬁve theoretically
identiﬁed groups discussed earlier, namely cultural diversity, welfare redistribution, socio-
economic-investments that we label as egalitarianism, EU integration and cultural
liberalism.
To make sure that the issue grouping is theoretically-led and consistent across
countries, we have followed the following steps. First of all, and guided by the theory,
we classiﬁed each issue into a speciﬁc issue group being consistent across countries.
Second, we checked this theoretical grouping with the help of exploratory factor analysis
– based on respondent issue positioning – and excluded issues that do not belong to any of
the ﬁve theoretically deﬁned groups.11 These are usually issues that have characterised the
election campaign in only one of the countries examined, and their ideologically cross-
cutting nature does not allow us to include them in any of the discussed groups.12 Explora-
tory factor analysis is conducted using respondent issue positioning instead of respondent
issue saliency because we are interested in line with previous attempts (Häusermann and
Kriesi 2015) to map the multidimensionality of the ideological space of the electorate in
the three countries examined. Finally, with the remaining issues, we performed Conﬁrma-
tory Factor Analysis (CFA) – again based on respondent issue positioning – to check for
the belongingness of each issue to the assigned group (see the Appendix for CFA results).
Speciﬁcally, we build the cultural liberalism scale using items referring to gender quotas
and gay marriages as well as issues related to environmental protection when available.
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Cultural diversity includes all the items related to immigration spanning the relevance of
asylum rules regulations, foreigners’ adaptation to the national culture and rules on the
number of refugees. European integration is operationalised using items on each country’s
EUmembership as well as euro membership. Twomain items represent egalitarianism that
is, income redistribution and an increase in the minimum wage. For Italy only we include
two additional items in this group namely the introduction of a basic income and univer-
sity fees as speciﬁcally characterising this country’s election campaign. Finally, the group of
issues related to welfare redistribution encompasses job market regulation, redistribution
through taxation, pension age and unemployment (see Table 1 for the full categorisation).
To measure salience of issues for parties on these same issues, we focus on Twitter feeds
of parties and their leading candidates during the entire campaign period.13 During the six
weeks before the election campaign, the Twitter content of the main parties running for
elections and their leading candidates were collected and coded by two independent
coders in each country to assess intercoder reliability of the coding scheme.14 As for
any other source of party communication, the reliance on Twitter comes with a trade-
oﬀ. On the one hand, studying party communication on Twitter might provide a better
alternative to party manifestos and party press releases to measure parties’ issue emphases.
In fact, while Twitter represents a more dynamic instrument for parties allowing them to
adapt their political messages to actual campaign events, party manifestos for example are
a rather static often time not read resource (e.g. Barbera 2015; Graham et al. 2013). On the
Table 1. Full issue categorisation.
Issue group Countries/Items
Austria Germany Italy
Cultural diversity asylum rules asylum rules
welfare for immigrants welfare for immigrants
foreigners’ cultural foreigners’ cultural
adaptation adaptation immigrant citizenship
refugees care
freedom of movement
number of refugees
Cultural liberalism gender quotas gender quotas
gay marriages gay marriages gay marriages
sustainable energy
diesel cars diesel cars
nuclear phase
wind turbines
euthanasia
soft drugs
legalise prostitution
EU integration EU refugee quotas EU refugee quotas
EU membership EU membership EU membership
Euro membership
Germany paying EU
poorer countries
Egalitarianism income diﬀerences income diﬀerences income diﬀerences
minimum wage minimum wage minimum wage
basic income
no university fees
Welfare redistribution job market regulations job market regulations job market regulations
taxation taxation taxation
pension age pension age pension age
unemployment
family bonus
Notes: the blank space in the single issue-row signiﬁes that issue has not been included in the respective citizen survey.
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other hand, the use of Twitter is not without drawbacks. In particular, the validity of our
conclusions is conditional on a necessary theoretical assumption, the so-called press-
release assumption that is deﬁned as follows:
[…] regardless of how many followers (and of which type) a party’s Twitter account might
have, and regardless of how unrepresentative and elitist the Twitter audience might be in a
given country, […] parties will use Twitter to communicate their desired messages to the
media, just like in a press release (De Sio et al. 2017, p. 11).
The appropriateness of this assumption appears well supported by previous empirical
research also in the three countries examined in this paper (Bruns and Burgess 2011; Par-
melee and Bichard 2011).
The dependent variable of our empirical models is the share of parties’ Twitter emphasis
on each issue for each party. The main independent variable of our study is public saliency,
which simply represents the percentage of all respondents (in the whole sample) that
reports the issue as having high priority.15 To test the ﬁrst hypothesis of our study we
simply interact public saliency with a categorical variable that separates mainstream
parties from populist parties on the left and right of the ideological spectrum. To test
the second and third hypothesis we additionally interact public saliency and party type
with a categorical variable of issue type. We recognise that there might be a reciprocal
relationship between voters and parties with not only parties responding to voters’ priori-
ties but also the other way round. Our assumption however, is that campaigns matter, i.e.
party emphasis eﬀorts will be diﬀerent before and during the campaign. This is why we
designed the CAWI survey to be run before the beginning of the campaign. The idea
here is that this would be a time where party strategists are aware of public priorities,
but have not yet unleashed the full power of their campaign issue emphasis eﬀorts.
We run Tobit models, with country ﬁxed eﬀects and errors clustered by party. Follow-
ing previous applications of this research design (De Sio et al. 2017), we choose Tobit
rather than linear regression models since our dependent variable is a proportion – con-
strained between 0 and 1 – with a strong asymmetrical distribution. In cases like this, pre-
dictions from a linear model are likely to lead to an underestimation of the uncertainty in
our inferences and therefore, we opt to treat our dependent variable as a distribution cen-
sored at 0. Clustering by party allows us to take into account, on the one hand, that we
have repeated observations by party for each issue, and on the other, to partially
control for party-level diﬀerences – like size and organisational structure – and variation
in their use of Twitter.16 In our dataset, each row represents a party × issue saliency
combination.
Empirical Findings
The baseline model in Table 2 (Model 1) is an empty model including only the country
ﬁxed eﬀects. The coeﬃcients of the ﬁxed eﬀects are non-signiﬁcant and the variance
explained by the model is extremely low, a sign that the contextual level explains very
little variation of our dependent variable. Model 2 in Table 2 includes the variable saliency
and we see a substantial increase in the variance explained.17 Speciﬁcally, the public sal-
iency variable has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on party Twitter emphasis, a result
that suggests that parties – in general – do indeed respond to public opinion. In Model
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Table 2. Explaining party issue emphasis: Tobit models.
Dependent variable: Twitter party issue saliency
(M1) (M2) (M3) (M4) (M5)
saliency 0.239*** (0.059) 0.276** (0.098) 0.480*** (0.124) 0.530** (0.202)
Reference: mainstream R
mainstream L 0.092 (0.065) 0.128 (0.149)
populist R −0.161* (0.067) −0.051 (0.194)
populist L 0.027 (0.067) −0.085 (0.194)
Reference: mainstream R × saliency
mainstream L × saliency −0.152 (0.096) −0.213 (0.209)
populist R × saliency 0.251* (0.097) 0.160 (0.333)
populist L × saliency −0.093 (0.094) 0.057 (0.265)
Reference: Cult diversity
Welfare 0.623*** (0.128) 0.625*** (0.159)
Egalitarianism 0.333*** (0.097) 0.495*** (0.148)
EU 0.128 (0.090) 0.179 (0.131)
Cult liberalism 0.125 (0.080) 0.151 (0.107)
Welfare × saliency −0.883*** (0.189) −0.871*** (0.230)
Egalitarianism × saliency −0.494** (0.153) −0.839*** (0.245)
EU × saliency −0.168 (0.143) −0.199 (0.244)
Cult liberalism × saliency −0.167 (0.120) −0.193 (0.161)
mainstream L × Welfare −0.005 (0.200)
mainstream L × Egalitarianism −0.210 (0.184)
mainstream L × EU −0.285 (0.163)
mainstream L × Cult liberalism −0.020 (0.129)
populist R × Welfare −0.702** (0.243)
populist R × Egalitarianism −0.076 (0.210)
populist R × EU 0.043 (0.215)
populist R × Cult liberalism −0.123 (0.143)
populist L × Welfare 0.535* (0.214)
populist L × Egalitarianism −0.265 (0.161)
populist L × EU 0.195 (0.205)
populist L × Cult liberalism 0.045 (0.196)
mainstream L × Welfare × saliency 0.027 (0.283)
mainstream L × Egalitarianism × saliency 0.446 (0.288)
mainstream L × EU × saliency 0.376 (0.278)
mainstream L × Cult liberalism × saliency 0.031 (0.180)
populist R × Welfare × saliency 0.852 (0.434)
populist R × Egalitarianism × saliency 0.119 (0.376)
populist R × EU × saliency −0.169 (0.398)
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populist R × Cult liberalism × saliency 0.131 (0.265)
populist L × Welfare × saliency −0.726* (0.310)
populist L × Egalitarianism × saliency 0.610* (0.268)
populist L × EU × saliency −0.344 (0.343)
populist L × Cult liberalism × saliency −0.091 (0.281)
Reference: Austria
Germany 0.014 (0.008) 0.023* (0.009) 0.026** (0.010) 0.031*** (0.009) 0.033*** (0.009)
Italy −0.024 (0.015) −0.018 (0.016) −0.015 (0.011) −0.006 (0.016) −0.002 (0.009)
constant 0.014 (0.007) −0.148*** (0.044) −0.167* (0.069) −0.327*** (0.088) −0.361* (0.142)
variance (party) 0.073*** (0.010) 0.069*** (0.009) 0.066*** (0.008) 0.065*** (0.008) 0.047*** (0.005)
N 247 247 247 247 247
AIC −255.786 −282.454 −288.478 −287.214 −254.715
BIC −241.748 −264.907 −249.875 −241.592 −195.056
VarExp 0.018 0.123 0.199 0.213 0.587
Standard errors in parentheses: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
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3, we distinguish between parties by interacting public saliency with party type. To ease the
interpretation of the results, Figure 1 plots the marginal eﬀect of public saliency on Twitter
emphasis by party type holding constant all the other variables in the model. We see that
saliency has a positive eﬀect on Twitter emphasis for all parties: as the salience of an issue
for the public increases, so does party emphasis. The marginal eﬀect is the largest for right-
wing populist parties compared to all other parties with a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence
for both mainstream and populist parties on the left (p < 0.001) and for mainstream right
(p < 0.05). Hence, our ﬁrst hypothesis that populist parties are more responsive to the issue
saliency of the public than mainstream parties ﬁnds partial support given that only right-
wing populist parties appear to be more responsive.
We now proceed to test our ﬁnal expectations; that is, that we should see diﬀerences
across populist parties on the right and on the left in terms of being responsive on
certain types of issues. First of all, in Model 4 we interact saliency with issue type and
note that all parties are generally less responsive to the public saliency on issue related
to egalitarianism and especially welfare redistribution compared to cultural diversity. In
other words, both economic issues receive far less responsiveness compared to non-econ-
omic issues, such as cultural diversity. Investigating recent election campaigns in Europe,
De Sio and Lachat (2018) ﬁnd that polarisation for both voters and parties is much higher
on the cultural dimension compared to the economic one. This suggests that the oppor-
tunities for parties to present distinct packages of issue positions are more limited in the
economic domain compared to the cultural domain, which aligns well with the ﬁndings
from our analysis suggesting that parties respond to the issues that are salient for the
public more on the cultural rather than on the economic domain. In this regard, we
notice that welfare redistribution is the issue that by far receives less responsiveness.
Figure 1. Marginal eﬀect of systemic saliency on party issue emphasis by party type.
Note: results based on Model 3 in Table 2.
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We can further probe this when interacting public saliency with party and issue type
(Model 5). Figure 2 shows again the marginal eﬀects to ease interpretation. Starting
with cultural diversity, the marginal eﬀect is positive for all parties and only slightly
more for mainstream and populist parties on the right but the diﬀerences across parties
are not statistically signiﬁcant. Moving to welfare redistribution, Figure 2 shows a negative
eﬀect for all parties except for the populist right that appears much more responsive on
this issue. The opposite is true for egalitarianism: for this issue, the marginal eﬀects are
negative or null for all parties except for the populist parties on the left which appear to
be the most responsive on this issue (albeit the diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant when compared
to mainstream left parties). On issues related to EU integration, while the marginal eﬀects
are all positive, we see no conspicuous diﬀerences across parties. On the last issue con-
sidered in this paper, cultural liberalism, all marginal eﬀects are positive while being
larger for populist right and signiﬁcantly larger when compared to the mainstream parties.
There are at least two important conclusions from this analysis. First, populist parties
on the right and the left appear to be slightly more responsive to public opinion on the
issues they own: cultural diversity and cultural liberalism for the right populists and ega-
litarianism for the left populists. However, the diﬀerences are not statistically signiﬁcant
when they are compared to mainstream parties on the same side of the ideological spec-
trum. Hence, populist right parties do not respond more or less compared to their main-
stream counterparts and the same holds true for the left-wing populist parties. Second, the
negative eﬀect of saliency on welfare redistribution for all parties except for the populist
parties points out the tension between responsibility and responsiveness: mainstream
parties seem to downplay as much as possible those issues where they recognise that
Figure 2. Marginal eﬀect of systemic saliency on party issue emphasis by party type.
Note: results based on Model 5 in Table 2.
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they cannot deliver, due to budget and external constraints. These ﬁndings suggest even a
sort of negative saliency responsiveness and sit well with recent ﬁndings that parties are
more limited in presenting strong pledges on economic issues and that party competition
has shifted accordingly (Oesch 2012). Interestingly, we ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect
of saliency for the issue of welfare for right populist parties, which might reﬂect these
parties’ eﬀorts to establish themselves on these issues next to the cultural proﬁle. The
FPÖ as well as Front National in France are typical examples of this strategy combining
appeals against globalisation and for the protection of ordinary people, starting from a cul-
tural nationalisation perspective.18
In sum, taking all the ﬁndings from this paper together we can conclude that overall
populist parties appear to be slightly more responsive to the public compared to their
mainstream counterparts on issues they own. This could well be due to the fact that in
all three cases examined in this paper, issue saliency in the respective national elections
was generally the highest on ‘their’ issues including immigration and egalitarianism.
While we do not examine party success at elections, we know that in all three countries
examined in this paper, populist parties have performed extremely well ending up in gov-
ernment in Austria and Italy and entering in Parliament for the ﬁrst time in Germany.
Feeling free from responsibility constraints has allowed them to even go beyond the sal-
iency of the overall electorate relying on the ‘representation of salient dichotomies and the
identity/diﬀerence dialectic’ (Andreadis and Stavrakakis, 2017, p. 504) capitalising on the
creation of an enemy of the people at both the national and transnational level.
Concluding Remarks
The ongoing electoral success of populist parties across Europe has fuelled debates about
the future of representative democracies. While critics consider populist parties as a danger
for liberal democracies, others point to the representation function that populist parties
can fulﬁl as mainstream parties are increasingly restricted by external constraints due to
multi-level governance. In this paper, we examine whether and how populist parties
can ﬁll representation voids by looking at party responsiveness and by distinguishing
between populist parties on the left and the right of the ideological spectrum in Austria,
Germany and Italy.
Using original data on both voters and parties, our ﬁndings show that overall parties are
more responsive towards citizens’ issue concerns on the cultural dimension while more
likely neglecting the economic one. However, the diﬀerences between populist parties
on the one hand and mainstream parties on the other are rather marginal. While we
see that populist right parties are overall responsive towards public salience, particularly
in issue categories such as cultural diversity, European integration and cultural liberalism,
the populist left parties are not as responsive towards public salience on ‘their’ issues, like
welfare redistribution, albeit they remain more responsive on egalitarianism. Populist left
parties also try to be responsive on the issue categories of cultural diversity and cultural
liberalism – as do the mainstream parties on the left and the right as well. The question
arises what the long-term repercussion might be when neglecting their issues and
riding-the-wave on issues purported by populist right parties.
Populist right parties stressing ‘their’ issues and reacting in a responsive manner to
public salience of issues can be part of a well-though-out strategy: as we in fact observe
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in terms of party positions (see Kedar 2005), voters may choose to support parties that are
a bit more extreme than themselves since they know that the constraints of party govern-
ment will force parties to water down their electoral pledges. From this perspective, popu-
list parties will certainly contribute to the transformation of the existing party systems as
they enlarge the political discourse by pushing further those issues mainstream parties
tried to avoid but now may have to react upon.
The important question is of course what the populist parties will do once in govern-
ment as the implications can have signiﬁcant impact on the quality of representation. On
the one hand, if they choose to be responsive, they may risk the status of the country and
its relations with its partners; on the other hand, choosing to be responsible can lead to a
serious disillusionment of the electorate that was mobilised by them during the election
campaign. The linkages between parties and the electorate thus need to be closely observed
in the coming years with an increasing number of populist parties entering government.
While this paper was unable to address such question given the small number of parties
included in the analysis, future works should investigate the extent to which parties’ organ-
isational structure, such as party size, can make themmore or less likely to be responsive to
the electorate.
Notes
1. The issue yield theory (De Sio &Weber, 2014) has further developed this idea, by conceptua-
lising and operationalising the electoral incentives and disincentives associated to diﬀerent
issues for each party.
2. http://cise.luiss.it/iccp/.
3. During the latest national election held onMarch 4, 2018, the new party leader Matteo Salvini
has dropped ‘Northern’ from the party name, using simply ‘The League’.
4. In November 2018 List Peter Pilz was renamed into Jetzt (Now). As we focus on the election
of 2017 we stick to the party name used during the electoral campaign.
5. The other countries included in the Issue Competition Comparative Project (ICCP) that is, the
UK, the Netherlands and France either do not have populist parties currently represented in
the Parliament (UK) or do not have both a right-wing and left-wing populist party competing
in elections.
6. While there exists a common agreement on which party can be characterised as populist right
party, with regard to populist left parties the classiﬁcation is less straightforward. Some com-
mentators regard Die Linke and M5S as populist left parties (see comments in Neue Zürcher
Zeitung, 30 July 2015), but others shy away to do so and would characterise Die Linke as a
party that is clearly oriented towards the left ideology but not populist, and M5S to embrace
both a right-wing and a left-wing ideology. Given recent policy activities of these two parties
(for instance, Sahra Wagenknecht of Die Linke who aims to establish a left movement ‘Auf-
stehen’ whose slogan is to listen to the people, or M5S who introduced a legislation on ‘labour
dignity’ in summer 2018), we consider these two parties as proponents of populism on the
left (see also Spierings and Zaslove (2017) for the classiﬁcation of M5S as a populist left
party). LPP meanwhile simply characterises itself as a populist left party. The classiﬁcation
we adopt also reﬂects the left-right ideological orientation of those parties’ supporters
being mostly on the left for Die Linke, M5S and LPP (data available upon request).
7. The M5S focused on ﬁve key issues (the so-called ‘Five Stars’): public water, sustainable trans-
port, sustainable development, Internet access and the environment – issues that overall are
connected with a left ideology.
8. See https://archiv2017.die-linke.de/die-linke/wahlen/archiv/archiv-bundestagswahl-2009/
positionen/themen-a-z/u-z/wirtschaftspolitik/
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9. Surveys were administered through CAWI to samples (N=1,000) representative of the voting
age population by sex-age combinations and geographical units.
10. While survey data measure both respondents’ position and saliency for each issue, only sal-
iency is used to measure responsiveness; issue positioning is exclusively used for exploratory
factor analysis.
11. The grouping of issues is not aimed to be analysed for the purpose of identifying issue oppor-
tunities for party strategy, but only for assessing which issues are related to common areas of
meaning in respondents’ minds. An obvious choice to do this is to investigate the content of
the issues, i.e. through issues positions, guided by the theory.
12. Speciﬁcally, we excluded ﬁve issues in Austria (on surveillance measures, property tax on
inheritance, direct democracy, comprehensive school and obligatory membership); ﬁve
issues in Italy (on tax evasion, economic globalisation, EU economic policies, vaccination
and self-defence); and one issue in Germany on binding referenda. While our results are
largely consistent to the inclusion of these issues, their cross-cutting nature render their
classiﬁcation in one of the ﬁve considered groups problematic.
13. Note that the Issue Competition Comparative Project (ICCP) only measures party issue sal-
iency not party positioning.
14. The coders have been instructed to code the Tweets into speciﬁc issue categories as well as to
identify Tweets dealing with non-issue content. Intercoder reliability is Kappa = 0.72 for
Austria, Kappa=0.91 for Germany and Kappa= 0.90 for Italy.
15. With respondents reporting ‘medium’ priority being counted as half.
16. Speciﬁc country analysis in the three countries investigated – see (Plescia et al. in press) –
show that exception made for the FPÖ, populist parties do not appear to use Twitter signiﬁ-
cantly less than their mainstream counterparts.
17. VarExp = v0 − v1/v0 where v stands for the variance of the residual on the lowest level esti-
mated by the mixed eﬀects tobit model, index 0 indicates the empty model, and index 1 indi-
cates the model of interest.
18. Given that we only have 250 cases for a model with many interactions, we have incrementally
simpliﬁed Model 5 to test for the robustness of our ﬁndings. The results show that the three-
way interactions signiﬁcant in Model 5 keep their signiﬁcance, and no other signiﬁcant inter-
actions emerge. The only exception is the interaction ‘populist R × Welfare × saliency’ that is
signiﬁcant at p < 0.1 in Model 5 and would turn signiﬁcant at p<0.001 in simpler models.
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Appendix. Filling the Void? Political Responsiveness of Populist Parties
Table A1. Conﬁrmatory Factor Analysis (Austria): standardised coeﬃcients.
Coef. Std. Err.
CULTURAL DIVERSITY
Asylum rules 0.861*** (0.013)
_constant 3.202*** (0.081)
Welfare beneﬁts for immigrants 0.865*** (0.013)
_constant 3.221*** (0.081)
Foreigners’ adaptation to Austrian culture 0.702*** (0.019)
_constant 3.632*** (0.090)
Freedom of movement 0.543*** (0.026)
_constant 1.919*** (0.056)
WELFARE
Pension age 0.421*** (0.042)
_constant 1.378*** (0.046)
Redistribution – taxation 0.391*** (0.042)
_constant 2.780*** (0.072)
Job market regulation 0.323*** (0.038)
_constant 1.632*** (0.050)
Unemployment vs national debt 0.469*** (0.037)
_constant 1.957*** (0.056)
EGALITARIANISM
Income diﬀerences 0.524*** (0.033)
_constant 1.664*** (0.051)
Minimum wage 0.603*** (0.034)
_constant 1.561*** (0.049)
EU
Refugee quotas 0.481*** (0.039)
_constant 1.497*** (0.048)
EU membership 0.673*** (0.045)
(Continued )
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Table A1. Continued.
Coef. Std. Err.
_constant 1.358*** (0.045)
CULTURAL LIBERALISM
Gender quotas 0.508*** (0.035)
_constant 1.973*** (0.056)
Gay marriages 0.544*** (0.034)
_constant 1.385*** (0.046)
Production sustainable energy 0.383*** (0.038)
_constant 1.609*** (0.049)
Diesel cars 0.365*** (0.038)
_constant 2.660*** (0.070)
N 935
LL −27246.46
BIC 54889.66
AIC 54608.91
CFI 0.847
TLI 0.805
RMSEA 0.075
Standard errors in parentheses: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
Table A2. Conﬁrmatory Factor Analysis (Germany): standardised coeﬃcients.
Coef. Std. Err.
CULTURAL DIVERSITY
Number of refugees 0.908*** (0.013)
_constant 2.889*** (0.073)
Asylum rules 0.868*** (0.014)
_constant 2.960*** (0.075)
Foreigners’ adaptation to German culture 0.612*** (0.022)
_constant 2.727*** (0.070)
WELFARE
Taxation – budget deﬁcit 0.197*** (0.050)
_constant 2.322*** (0.062)
Pension age 0.466*** (0.054)
_constant 2.880*** (0.073)
Job market regulation 0.619*** (0.065)
_constant 3.264*** (0.081)
EGALITARIANISM
Income diﬀerences 0.458*** (0.041)
_constant 1.660*** (0.050)
Minimum wage 0.659*** (0.050)
_constant 1.379*** (0.045)
EU
Refugee quotas 0.315*** (0.036)
_constant 1.604*** (0.049)
EU membership 0.568*** (0.031)
_constant 1.295*** (0.044)
EU transfer money 0.682*** (0.030)
_constant 2.345*** (0.062)
CULTURAL LIBERALISM
Nuclear power 0.673*** (0.030)
_constant 1.609*** (0.049)
Gender quotas 0.355*** (0.036)
_constant 1.981*** (0.055)
Wind turbines 0.505*** (0.032)
_constant 1.827*** (0.052)
Diesel cars 0.388*** (0.034)
_constant 2.152*** (0.058)
Gay marriages 0.383*** (0.035)
_constant 1.296*** (0.044)
N 969
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Table A2. Continued.
Coef. Std. Err.
LL −27876.28
BIC 56151.38
AIC 55868.56
CFI 0.889
TLI 0.858
RMSEA 0.061
Standard errors in parentheses: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
Table A3. Conﬁrmatory Factor Analysis (Italy): standardised coeﬃcients.
Coef. Std. Err.
CULTURAL DIVERSITY
Citizenship to immigrants 0.763*** (0.023)
_constant 1.950*** (0.057)
Welfare for immigrants 0.714*** (0.024)
_constant 2.183*** (0.062)
Number of refugees 0.706*** (0.023)
_constant 3.055*** (0.080)
WELFARE
Job market regulation 0.152*** (0.041)
_constant 1.873*** (0.056)
Pension age 0.169*** (0.049)
_constant 1.441*** (0.048)
Taxation 0.401*** (0.051)
_constant 1.325*** (0.046)
Bonus for families 0.445*** (0.042)
_constant 1.543*** (0.050)
EGALITARIANISM
Income diﬀerences 0.435*** (0.037)
_constant 1.474*** (0.048)
University tuitions 0.429*** (0.039)
_constant 1.838*** (0.055)
Minimum wage 0.230*** (0.040)
_constant 1.436*** (0.048)
Basic income 0.612*** (0.039)
_constant 1.511*** (0.049)
EU
Euro membership 0.805*** (0.024)
_constant 2.111*** (0.060)
EU membership 0.894*** (0.025)
_constant 2.370*** (0.065)
CULTURAL LIBERALISM
End of life legislation 0.495*** (0.042)
_constant 1.462*** (0.048)
Gay marriages 0.465*** (0.042)
_constant 1.438*** (0.048)
Soft drugs legalisation 0.598*** (0.045)
_constant 1.850*** (0.055)
Prostitution legalisation 0.367*** (0.047)
_constant 1.503*** (0.049)
N 889
LL −28202.05
BIC 56818.30
AIC 56526.11
CFI 0.761
TLI 0.702
RMSEA 0.087
Standard errors in parentheses: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
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